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Analysts’ stock recommendations, earnings growth and risk 
  
Abstract—A key output of sell-side analysts is their recommendations to investors as to 
whether they should, buy, hold or sell a company’s shares. However, relatively little is 
known regarding the determinants of those recommendations. This paper considers this 
question, presenting results that suggest that recommendations are dependent on analysts’ 
short-term and long-term earnings growth forecasts, as well as on proxies for the 
analysts’ unobservable views on earnings growth in the more distant future and risk. 
Furthermore, analysts who appear to incorporate earnings growth beyond the long-term 
growth forecast horizons and risk into their recommendation decisions make more 











Sell-side analysts are important information intermediaries in the capital market. Over the 
past four decades, a staggering number of published academic studies – more than five 
hundred to date – have examined the properties of analysts’ earnings per share forecasts 
(for useful reviews, see, e.g., Brown, 2000; Ramnath et al., 2008a, 2008b; Bradshaw, 
2011). However, Schipper (1991) notes that earnings forecasts are just one output of sell-
side research; she calls for more study of how analysts reach their final judgments, 
expressed in the form of buy-sell-hold stock recommendations.  
Some limited progress has been made in the two decades that have passed since 
Schipper (1991) reached this conclusion (Ramnath et al., 2008a; Bradshaw, 2011; Brown 
et al., 2015). However, much still remains to be done. One difficulty that researchers face 
is that the work analysts perform is unobservable. Nevertheless, as Bradshaw (2011) 
notes, we have reached a point where some penetration of the “black box” is required in 
order to develop deeper insights. He suggests that a potentially useful approach would be 
to simultaneously examine analysts’ multiple summary outputs. This is the focus of the 
present paper.  
We build on the prior literature within the context of a valuation framework. This 
provides a structured approach to think about the linkages between the forecasts and 
stock recommendations carried out by analysts. We predict that analysts’ stock 
recommendations are positively associated with their forecasts of earnings growth in the 
short-term and in the medium-term. We also predict that analysts’ stock 
recommendations will be positively influenced by their expectations of earnings growth 
in the more distant future, and be negatively associated with their views on risk, neither 
of which can be directly conveyed by analysts to investors in simple but credible metrics. 
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To test these predictions, we examine the relationships between analysts’ stock 
recommendations and (1) their short-term earnings growth and long-term growth 
forecasts, (2) proxies designed to capture their expectations about earnings growth 
beyond their long-term growth forecast horizons, and (3) risk metrics employed to proxy 
for analysts’ risk assessments. Our study uses U.S. data covering the 1995-2012 period.   
We believe this paper is among the first to provide empirical evidence that analysts’ 
long-term growth forecasts appear to incorporate the tendency of profitability to revert to 
the mean over time. We find that, all else being equal, firms with higher short-term 
earnings growth forecasts receive more favourable stock recommendations. Consistent 
with Bradshaw (2004), we show that the relationship between stock recommendations 
and long-term growth forecasts is positive, but in addition we show that the relationship 
is non-linear and declining, reflecting the valuation implication of profitability being 
mean-reverting. We also show that above-mean (below-mean) profitability has positive 
(negative) but diminishing effects on stock recommendations. We find that stock price 
volatility is negatively associated with stock recommendations. In contrast, market beta 
appears to enter analysts’ recommendation decisions primarily through its adverse 
mediating effect on the sensitivity of recommendations to long-term growth forecasts. 
Bradshaw (2004) suggests that the relationship between analysts’ long-term growth 
forecasts and recommendations has a negative impact on the value of their stock 
recommendations.1 This conclusion is based on Bradshaw’s (2004) evidence that long-
                                                 
1 Previous studies have shown that recommendation revisions and levels of individual recommendations 
(when “hold” recommendations are treated as “sell” recommendations) are associated with future returns 
(e.g., Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Ertimur et al., 2007). Bradshaw (2004), 
however, finds that consensus recommendations are not associated with abnormal returns. In our view, 
levels of consensus recommendations are more likely subject to distortions caused by analysts’ conflict of 
interests than recommendation revisions, and thus might not be best suited for assessing the value of 
recommendations. 
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term growth forecasts are negatively associated with future stock returns. In contrast, 
Jung et al. (2012) show that the market appears to view long-term growth forecasts as 
informative, and reacts more strongly to recommendation revisions that are accompanied 
by long-term growth forecasts. Motivated by this line of inquiry, we also investigate 
whether analysts’ incorporation of expectations about earnings growth beyond their long-
term growth forecast horizons and their incorporation of risk is associated with the 
profitability of their stock recommendations. Our empirical analysis suggests that 
analysts who are employed by large brokerage firms and who follow less industries and 
have higher forecast accuracy and more firm-specific experience are more likely to 
incorporate earnings growth beyond long-term growth forecast horizons in making 
recommendations. We find that abnormal returns of stock recommendations issued by 
analysts who appear to take into account earnings growth beyond their long-term growth 
forecast horizons and risk are significantly higher than those of other analysts. Additional 
empirical analyses also suggest that our proxies for analysts’ expectations about earnings 
growth beyond their long-term growth forecast horizons predict the realized actual 
earnings growth rates in the next ten years, and that the stock market appears to price the 
proxies in a way that is consistent with how they are linked to analyst recommendations. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it extends and 
complements previous studies that attempt to explain analysts’ recommendation 
decisions (e.g., Block, 1999; Bradshaw, 2002, 2004; Brown et al., 2015). Bradshaw 
(2004) documents a positive relationship between analysts’ stock recommendations and 
long-term growth forecasts using a parsimonious empirical specification as a first pass to 
look at the issue. We build on this work by presenting results that suggest that stock 
recommendations are also dependent on analysts’ short-term earnings growth forecasts 
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and their expectations about earnings growth in the more distant future, as well as of their 
views about risk. Second, this study contributes proxies for constructs that are already in 
the models of analysts’ decisions but cannot be conveyed by analysts to investors in a 
simple and credible metric. Third, we extend previous studies (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2007; 
Jung et al., 2012) that examine the relationship between analyst earnings and long-term 
growth forecasts and the economic value of their recommendations. We present results 
that suggest that analysts’ incorporation of risk and expectations about earnings growth 
beyond long-term growth forecast horizons is associated with their providing more 
profitable recommendations. Not only do these findings enhance our understanding of 
analysts’ recommendation decisions, they also have the potential to assist investors in 
identifying which recommendations are likely to signal positive returns and which will 
not. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our 
theoretical framework and predictions, and describes our research design. Section 3 
outlines our sampling procedure and data, and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 
reports results and presents our investigation of the effect of incorporation of risk and 
long-run earnings growth on recommendation profitability, while section 5 summarizes 
and concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and research design   
2.1. Outputs of sell-side analysts 
Sell-side analysts are important information intermediaries in the capital market. In 
addition to providing detailed comments and discussions of the prospects of companies 
and industries they follow, analysts generally provide three summary outputs of their 
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work: (1) a short-term earnings per share (EPS) forecast; (2) a forecast of growth in 
expected EPS, typically over a three-to-five year horizon; and (3) a recommendation to 
investors to buy, hold, or sell the stock.2 While the first one has been extensively studied 
by accounting researchers, the last two have received much less attention.  
A useful way of thinking about such recommendations and earnings forecasts is by 
reference to an accounting-based pricing equation of the sort developed by Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005). Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) show that the economic 
value of an equity security at date t=0 is equal to the capitalized next-period (FY1) 
expected earnings per share, eps1, plus the present value of capitalized abnormal growth 












t R 1110ˆ         (1a) 
 
where: 0ˆP can be thought of as the analyst’s view of how much the stock is really worth 
(which may differ from the current share price, 0P ); r is the cost of capital and 𝑅𝑅 = 1 +
𝑟𝑟; and ( )[ ]tttt dpsrrepsepsaeps ⋅−+−= ++ 111  is the abnormal earnings growth, defined 
as the change in EPS adjusted for the cost of capital and dividends (dpst). To relate 
Equation (1a) to the earnings forecasts reported by analysts, it is helpful to break the 
stream of future payoffs into three sets, as follows:   
                                                 
2 It is also commonplace for analysts to provide a so-called “target price,” which is their prediction of 
the share price in the future (usually one year hence). We do not consider this metric further here as it is 
logically a function of the analyst’s predictions of a firm’s future performance. The central focus of this 
paper is the relationship between recommendations and earnings growth forecasts. Target price can be 
influenced by factors that fall outside the scope of this study, such as expectations of interest rate changes. 
Moreover, using target price as a proxy for expected price would shift the focus away from the relationship 
between recommendations and the earnings and earnings growth forecasts, which are the central outputs of 
the analyst’s work and the primary concern of this paper. 
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For expositional purposes, assume that aeps grows at a constant compound rate 1g  
during the medium term (years 3-5), i.e., ),1( 11 gaepsaeps tt +=+ ,4,...,2=t  and at 2g





























































epsP                      (2) 
This provides the framework for thinking about the outputs of financial analysts. 
The analyst provides two measures of future earnings: a forecast of one-year-ahead 
earnings per share, ,1eps and a forecast of what is conventionally but somewhat 
misleadingly referred to as “long-term” (really medium-term) growth in earnings, LTG, 
where .4,...,2,1),1(1 =+=+ tLTGepseps tt  From this, we could infer that the rate of 
growth, 1g , in abnormal earnings over this interval (together with the discount rate, r) will 
enable the analyst to arrive at an estimate of the second term on the right-hand side of 
Equation (1b). If a firm pays out all its medium-term earnings as dividends, abnormal 
earnings growth during this period will be reduced to ,11 ttt epsepsaeps −= ++ and 
.1 LTGg =  However, to complete the valuation exercise represented by Equation (2), the 
investor must also estimate ,2g the growth rate of aeps in the more distant future, and 
this cannot be discerned from the analyst’s published outputs. In what follows, we follow 
conventional market practices here and define what is really medium-term earnings 
growth as long-term growth (LTG), and define the unobservable “really-long-term 
growth” in eps as .2 RLTGg =  
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Within this framework, we can treat 0ˆP  as a representation of the (unobservable) 
view the analyst has of how much the stock is worth, and the analyst’s recommendation 
(REC) as a function of the difference between this unobservable amount and the stock’s 
current price
 
P0. We can also treat  as dependent on (1) the analyst’s observable 
forecasts of 1eps  and LTG, (2) the unobservable RLTG, and (3) the discount rate for the 
stock, the principal determinant of which is the analyst’s (also unobservable) views on 









                                   (3) 
Logically, analysts ought to make a buy recommendation when intrinsic value is 
sufficiently larger than current price to justify the transaction costs involved (i.e., 𝑃𝑃�0 ≫
𝑃𝑃0), and vice versa when the reverse condition holds (𝑃𝑃�0 ≪ 𝑃𝑃0). Being dependent on 
 REC therefore ought to depend on the extent to which analysts think their beliefs 
regarding ,1eps LTG, RLTG, and RISK, are at variance with those embedded in current 
prices.  
However, analysts’ views are not observable. Hence we formulate the reduced form 
of (3) in terms of the analysts’ beliefs concerning the levels of these variables, i.e., as 
( ).,,,1 RISKRLTGLTGepsgREC =  We use this framework to explore the relationship 
between analysts’ stock recommendations and their forecasts of earnings ( 1eps  and 
LTG), and how these relationships can be affected by their beliefs about RLTG and RISK. 
Because we are unable to identify the direction or extent to which our observable 
measures 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1, LTG, RISK and our proxies for RLTG differ from current market beliefs, 
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classification errors will result. This will reduce the power of our tests to detect 
relationships between REC and these measures.3  
A starting point for our investigation is Bradshaw (2004) who examines how analysts 
use their earnings forecasts to generate stock recommendations. The author analyzes the 
associations between stock recommendations and value estimates derived from the 
residual income model and practical valuation heuristics using analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. He finds that LTG better explains the cross-sectional variation in analysts’ 
stock recommendations compared to residual income value estimates.  
Bradshaw’s (2004) empirical specification is parsimonious in that it involves 
regressing REC on LTG alone, and does not consider 1eps . However, our framework, and 
the huge amount of attention given to 1eps in the financial press (Brown, 1993), suggests 
it is an important additional analyst output, and one therefore likely to be an important 
determinant of their recommendations. Bradshaw’s (2004) empirical specification 
implicitly assumes that LTG will persist indefinitely, and thus no account need be taken 
of RLTG (i.e., of the analysts’ unobservable views of the more distant future), or of RISK 
(their assessments of how risk should affect share valuations). Previous studies (e.g., La 
Porta, 1996; Dechow and Sloan, 1997) that examine the relationship between earnings 
expectations and stock returns have also used analysts’ LTG forecasts to proxy for 
investors’ expectations about earnings growth in all future years without explicitly 
considering the likely declining persistence of LTG.  
                                                 
3 The rationale for this reduced-form expression is that cross-sectional differences in earnings forecasts 
will reflect differences in the extent to which forecasts have been revised (the further a forecast is away 
from the mean, the more likely it is to be the result of a forecast revision). This seems plausible, given that 
our focus is on consensus (rather than individual) recommendations and earnings forecasts. 
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To advance our understanding of the role of analysts’ earnings growth expectations in 
their stock recommendation decisions, we analyze the effects of the short-term earnings 
growth rate (i.e., the proportionate increase in forecast 1eps over the reported earnings 
per share of the previous fiscal year, 0eps ), LTG, and proxies designed to capture the 
extent to which the latent variable RLTG differs from LTG.  
There are good reasons to believe that earnings growth rates change over time.  
Standard economic arguments suggest that profitability is mean-reverting under 
competitive conditions: entrepreneurs seek to enter profitable industries and exit less 
profitable ones (e.g., Stigler, 1963). This prediction is consistent with the evidence (e.g., 
Brooks and Buckmaster, 1976; Freeman et al., 1982; Fama and French, 2000). Based on 
these arguments, we make two predictions: 
1. REC is a positive but diminishing function of LTG: 0/ >∂∂ LTGREC  and
0/ 22 <∂∂ LTGREC .  
2. Above-mean (below-mean) past profitability will have a positive (negative) but 
diminishing effect on REC. 
The first prediction reflects the attenuating effect the unobservable latent variable RLTG 
is expected to have on the analyst’s estimation of intrinsic value, ,0ˆP and hence on REC. 
In our design, RLTG plays the role of a correlated omitted variable. We address this 
problem in our experimental design in two ways: by modifying our expectations 
concerning the relationship between REC and LTG, and by incorporating profitability 
mean reversion into the design. 
If we hold all else equal, economic theory predicts that the risk-aversion of investors 
will result in high-risk companies having lower equity prices than low-risk ones. Not only 
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will high predicted earnings growth attract competition, it will often be dependent on 
high-risk investments in R&D and other intangibles. We therefore predict that REC will 
be a negative function of RISK: .0/ <∂∂ RISKREC   
 
2.2. Research design 
We use a quadratic model of LTG, REC = g(LTG, LTG2…) to test for the predicted 
attenuating effect of the correlated omitted variable RLTG on the analyst’s estimation of 
intrinsic value, ,0ˆP and hence on REC. We predict REC will be positively associated with 
LTG and negatively associated with LTG2, because the higher LTG is, the greater the 
potential deviation between RLTG and LTG and the less weight the analysts will place on 
LTG in estimating .0ˆP  To reflect the possibility that analysts respond differently to the 
mean reversion of losses and profits we also use an alternative model including two 
interaction variables between LTG and indicator variables representing the bottom and 
top LTG quartiles, respectively, to examine the relationship between LTG and 
recommendations. 
We allow for the previously documented fact that the reversion of profitability to its 
mean can take a very long time (e.g., Fairfield et al., 2009). The extent to which 
profitability deviates from its mean signals expected changes in profitability and earnings 
growth in the long run. Hence, we use this deviation to construct proxies for the latent 
variable, RLTG. We follow Fama and French (2000) both in our estimation of the mean 
of profitability and in how profitability reverts to its mean. We then examine the effects 
of the latent variable RLTG on stock recommendations using measures representing both 
the magnitude and direction of the deviations of profitability from its mean. We predict 
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that analysts are likely to think favourably of firms with high past profitability, and their 
recommendations are likely affected by their expectations about how profitability will 
change in the long run. We predict above-mean (below-mean) past profitability will have 
a positive (negative) but diminishing effect on REC.  
We define profitability in terms of return on equity (ROE), as analysts’ work focuses 
on equities. We first estimate a cross-sectional regression model of the return on equity 
that closely resembles the one used by Fama and French (2000). We then use the 
coefficient estimates to compute the expected value of return on equity ( )(ROEE ), i.e., a 
proxy for the mean of profitability, for a given firm: 
ε+++++++= LEVERAGEdRDdLogMVdPAYOUTdDDdBMddROE 6543210  (4) 
where: BM is the ratio of book equity to the market value of equity at the end of period t; 
DD is equal to 1 if the firm issues dividends during the period, and 0 otherwise; PAYOUT 
is the dividend payout ratio; LogMV is the natural log of market value; R&D is the ratio 
of research and development expenses to net sales; and LEVERAGE is the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. The explanatory variables in Equation (4) are chosen on the 
basis that: (1) book-to-market captures expected future firm profitability, (2) firms paying 
dividends tend to be much more profitable than those that do not pay any (Fama and 
French, 1999; Choi et al., 2011), (3) firms tend to relate dividends to recurring earnings, 
and the distribution of dividends thus conveys information about expected future earnings 
(Miller and Modigliani, 1961), (4) large firms tend to have higher and more stable 
profitability than small firms, (5) R&D investments affect earnings negatively in the near 
term, but foster future growth in earnings, and (6) financing activities raise funds for 
expansion and growth, and leverage affects the ROE denominator.       
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For each firm-month observation, we compute the deviation of past ROE from its 
expected value (hereafter, DFE) by taking the difference between ROE in the previous 
year and its expected value, :)(ROEE 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐷𝐷(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1). Let NDFE denote 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 < 0 and PDFE denote 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 > 0. Fama and French (2000) find that the speed of 
mean reversion is faster when return on assets is below its expected value, and when it is 
further from the expected value in either direction. They use the squared values of NDFE 
and PDFE to measure the magnitude to which profitability is below and above its 
expected value, respectively. For the purpose of modelling the diminishing effect of 
above-mean (below-mean) past profitability on REC, the squared values of NDFE and 
PDFE are computed and denoted as SNDFE and SPDFE, respectively. We predict REC 
will be positively associated with PDFE, NDFE, and SNDFE, and negatively associated 
with SPDFE. 
Before testing our predictions, we carry out an exploratory analysis to see whether 
analysts appear to incorporate mean reversion in profitability when forecasting LTG. 
Fama and French (2000) analyze the impact of profitability mean reversion on future 
earnings by regressing changes in reported earnings on measures that capture the 
magnitude and direction of deviations of profitability from its mean. We use their 
regression specification, simply substituting LTG for changes in reported earnings, the 
dependent variable in their model: 
εα +++++= SPDFEbSNDFEbNDFEbDFEbLTG 4321                (5) 
Based on Fama and French’s (2000) work, we make the following predictions concerning 
𝑏𝑏1 < 0, 𝑏𝑏2 < 0, 𝑏𝑏3 > 0,  𝑏𝑏4 < 0. 
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Existing evidence on how analysts make allowances for risk is scarce. One possibility 
is that analysts adjust for the risk of equity by discounting future payoffs using a discount 
factor based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965) (CAPM), 
an approach emphasized in standard valuation textbooks. Prior research, however, 
suggests that analysts tend to mainly rely on valuation multiples instead of present value 
models, and that they are concerned about risk in a firm-specific sense rather than in 
terms of its marginal impact on a well-diversified portfolio (e.g., Barker, 1999; Block, 
1999). This raises the possibility that analysts do not adjust for risk by using a discount 
factor based on a formal pricing model such as the CAPM. Consistent with Kecskes et al. 
(2011), our own reading of brokers’ reports suggests that risk is generally defined by 
reference to firm-specific operational and business risks, and uncertainties concerning 
macroeconomic factors that potentially affect a firm’s future earnings. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to construct a quantitative measure of analysts’ risk assessments by codifying 
such qualitative discussions. At any rate, no such metric is currently available. Moreover, 
to our best knowledge, few brokerage houses generate quantitative risk forecasts, and no 
such data are available from any data vendor. Hence, instead of examining how analysts’ 
(unobservable) risk assessments affect their stock recommendations, we step back and 
ask a different question: To what extent do analysts take into account traditional risk 
measures in making stock recommendations? 
We mainly consider two traditional risk measures, market beta and stock price 
volatility. The CAPM assumes that only systematic risk (market beta) is priced. 
However, it has been demonstrated theoretically that in a market with incomplete 
information and transaction costs, rational investors price idiosyncratic risk (Merton, 
1987) and there is evidence that idiosyncratic risk does indeed play a role in explaining 
 15 
the cross-section of average stock returns (Malkiel and Xu, 1997, 2006). Furthermore, 
sell-side analysts specialize by industry and usually follow a limited number of stocks 
(Boni and Womack, 2006), suggesting that they might not take full account of the big 
(diversification) picture when recommending individual stocks.  
Fama and French (1992) argue that the risk of a stock is also a function of firm size 
and book-to-market. Behavioural studies (e.g., La Porta, 1996; Dechow and Sloan, 1997) 
argue that the book-to-market factor in returns is the result of market participants 
systematically overestimating (underestimating) the growth prospects of growth (value) 
firms. We do not address why size and book-to-market may affect returns, but simply 
include them as controls.  
We also examine the potential interactions between risk and growth. The future 
earnings of high beta firms are likely to be more sensitive to changes in the overall 
economy. We predict that analysts are able to capture this earnings implication of market 
beta and discount the LTG forecasts of high beta firms when making recommendations. 
Meanwhile, for a firm with high growth but also a high degree of risk, analysts are likely 
to issue a less favourable recommendation. We allow for such possible interaction 
between LTG and market beta and stock price volatility in our empirical analysis. 
We compute the analyst’s short-term earnings growth forecast (hereafter, SG) using 
the formula: ( ) .001 EPSEPSEPSSG −= EPS1 is one-year-ahead consensus earnings per 
share forecast, and EPS0 is the last reported earnings per share. Because it is difficult to 
make economic sense of SG when 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸0 < 0, we follow Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) by 
computing the short-term growth forecast only for observations with positive EPS0. We 
predict SG to be positively associated with stock recommendations. 
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Prior research has shown that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistically biased, 
possibly due to analysts’ incentives to generate trading, to cultivate management, and to 
maintain good relationships with underwriting clients of their brokerage firms (e.g., 
Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Jackson, 2005; Brown et al., 
2015). However, it is possible that the analysts may take into account the optimistic bias 
in their earnings forecasts when making stock recommendations. We include the signed 
forecast error of EPS1 (Forecast Error) in our empirical specifications to capture this 
possible element in analysts’ recommendation decisions. We predict the coefficient on 
Forecast Error to be negative, reflecting the analysts’ effort to discount the optimistic 
bias in their earnings forecasts.   
We primarily use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to test our 
predictions. Following Bradshaw (2004), Barniv et al. (2009) and He et al. (2013), we 
use the monthly consensus (mean) stock recommendation as the dependent variable. We 
use consensus (i.e., average) data, both to facilitate comparison with key prior studies and 
because there are strong reasons to believe that average measures are likely to better 
reflect the price setting process in the market. In addition, we also examine our 
predictions using multinomial ordered logit regression analysis, in which the dependent 
variable is the quintile ranking of monthly consensus stock recommendation, a 5-point 
scale discrete variable.  



























        (6a) 
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where: REC represents either the monthly consensus stock recommendation or the 
quintile ranking of monthly consensus recommendations; SG represents the analyst’s 
short-term earnings growth forecast; LTG represents the monthly consensus earnings 
growth forecast for the next three-to-five years; and LTG2 represents the square value of 
LTG; NDFE represents negative deviations of ROE from its mean; PDFE represents 
positive deviations of ROE from its mean; and SNDFE and SPDFE represent the square 
of NDFE and PDFE, respectively.  
Forecast Error is measured by dividing the difference between EPS1 and the actual 
earnings per share (EPSa) by the absolute value of EPSa. Beta is calculated monthly using 
five years’ monthly stock and market returns; Volatility represents the three-month stock 
price volatility; LTG × Beta and LTG × Volatility represent the interaction variables 
between LTG and Beta and Volatility, respectively; LogMV represents size as measured 
by market capitalisation; and BM is the book-to-market ratio. We predict the coefficients 
on Beta, Volatility, BM, and LTG × Beta to be negative and the coefficient on LogMV to 
be positive. We make no prediction with regard to the sign of LTG × Volatility. The 
model controls for both year and industry effects by including year indicator variables (Yr 
Dummy) and industry indicator variables (Industry Dummy) formed based on the 1st level 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry classification. 
To reflect the fact that the mean reversion of profitability can be up or down, we also 
analyze the potential effect of the latent variable RLTG on the relationship between REC 
and LTG using an alternative model that includes two interaction variables between LTG 
and indicator variables representing the bottom and the top LTG quartiles respectively. 
We expect the top (bottom) quartile LTG forecasts to have a weaker (stronger) effect on 
stock recommendation relative to the other two quartiles of LTG forecasts to reflect that 
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high (low) profitability will revert to the mean in the long run. The regression equation 




































  (6b) 
where: REC is monthly consensus stock recommendation; LTG_Q1 is 1 when the LTG 
forecast falls into the bottom quartile of LTG and 0 otherwise; LTG_Q4 is 1 when LTG 
belongs to the top quartile of LTG and 0 otherwise; and LTG × LTG_Q1 and LTG × 
LTG_Q4 are interaction variables between LTG and LTG_Q1 and LTG_Q4, respectively. 
We predict the coefficient on LTG_Q1 to be negative and that on LTG_Q4 to be positive. 
We expect the coefficient on LTG × LTG_Q1 to be positive and that on LTG × LTG_Q4 
to be negative.  
 
3. Sample selection, data and descriptive statistics 
Our sample selection procedures are summarised in Table 1. The analyst data are from 
the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Our sample covers the period 
January 1995-December 2012. We obtain monthly consensus analyst forecasts including 
stock recommendations (mean), long-term growth (median), and one-year-ahead earnings 
per share (EPS1) for all U.S. firms listed on the NYSE, the AMEX, and on NASDAQ. 
I/B/E/S enters reported earnings on the same basis as analysts’ forecasts. To ensure 
comparability, we use the actual earnings per share (EPS0) from the I/B/E/S detailed 
actual file for the estimation of SG and ROE. During the sample period, I/B/E/S analysts 
provide both recommendations and EPS1 forecasts for 16,877 U.S. firms. LTG forecasts 
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are available for approximately 79% of these firms. We eliminate duplicated monthly 
observations.  
We merge I/B/E/S data with COMPUSTAT data used for the calculation of 
accounting variables. We require firm-month observations to have positive EPS0 and 
book value per share for the estimation of SG and ROE, respectively. We estimate risk 
variables for firm-month units using firm and stock return data from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Beta is estimated each month by regressing 
monthly returns of the stock on monthly market returns over a five-year period. 
Volatility4 is measured using the annualized standard deviation of daily returns three 
months preceding the consensus recommendation dates. Definitions of variables used in 
empirical analysis are detailed in Table 2. 
To mitigate the potential influence of outliers, we eliminate 1% of the lowest and 
highest tails of all variables except the consensus monthly stock recommendations. The 
sample we use to analyze whether analysts’ LTG forecasts incorporate the mean reversion 
in profitability comprises 401,451 firm-month observations, representing 7,023 distinct 
firms. The sample used for the estimation of the full model of Equation (6a), includes 
284,655 firm-month observations and 4,946 distinct firms. Following prior literature, the 
coding of recommendations is inverted to be 1= strong sell, 2=sell, 3=hold, 4=buy and 
5=strong buy. 
Panel A in Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables that will be 
used in the subsequent analysis. Both the mean and the median of consensus 
                                                 
4 , where σ is standard deviation; j represents the number 
of business days in the period; and m represents the number of days in the period. 
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recommendation are close to a buy rating (3.782; 3.800), revealing analysts’ optimism 
that has been widely documented in prior literature. The mean and median of LTG are 
0.170 and 0.150, respectively. The mean of SG is 0.192, higher than mean LTG. The 
average ROE of the sample firms is 8.6%. The mean and median of DFE, deviation of 
ROE from its expected value, are −0.002 and −0.010, respectively; the mean of negative 
deviations is −0.027 and that of positive deviations is 0.025. The mean (median) of 
market beta and stock price volatility are 1.085 (0.973) and 0.476 (0.409), respectively.  
Panel B in Table 2 presents the results of Pearson correlation analysis of the main 
variables used in the subsequent empirical analysis. Stock recommendations are 
positively correlated with both the short-term and the medium-term earnings growth 
forecasts and with ROE but are negatively correlated with DFE. Both Beta and Volatility 
are positively correlated with recommendations. Note that the positive correlation 
between recommendations and Volatility possibly is caused by year effects (price 
volatility was extremely high during the two most recent stock market crashes). LTG is 
negatively correlated with past ROE and its deviation from its expected value DFE. SG is 
also negatively associated with both ROE and DFE. The moderate correlation between 
Beta and Volatility (0.332) indicates that the information content of the two risk measures 
is to some degree overlapping; Volatility and Beta are both manifestations of risk. This 
necessitates the control of each of the pair in the regression tests. The mean of DD was 
0.462, indicating that in less than half of the sample firm-years were dividends paid.  
Our OLS regression analyses use panel data pooled across firms and multiple periods 
(months). When the residuals are correlated across observations, OLS standard errors can 
be biased and the inferences about the coefficient estimates will be inaccurate. Following 
Petersen (2009), we therefore adjust the standard errors of the regression slopes in our 
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regression tests for the possible dependence in residuals by clustering standard errors on 
firm and month dimensions. 
Our sample covers three sub-periods marked by dramatic shifts in the economic 
conditions in the U.S. as well as important regulatory changes. The first sub-period is 
1995-2000, which covers the dot-com bubble period, during which time analysts and 
investors were highly optimistic about the growth prospects of high-tech stocks. The 
second sub-period follows the introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) and 
ends in 2006, a period often referred to as “the great moderation”. RegFD was 
promulgated by the SEC in August 2000, after which analysts lost their privileged access 
to corporate management. RegFD changed the information environment and to some 
extent the incentives analysts face (Jung et al., 2012). The final sub-period from 2007 to 
2012 covers the years of the financial crisis and its aftermath. Our empirical analyses are 
based on the sample covering the 1995-2012 period. We repeat the empirical analysis for 
each of the above sub-periods, but for space reasons report without tabulating the results.  
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1. Relationship between analysts’ LTG forecasts and profitability mean reversion 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results of the first-stage cross-sectional regression that is 
used to construct a proxy for the mean of ROE.5 PAYOUT, BM and R&D are negatively 
associated with ROE, while DD, LogMV and LEVERAGE are positively associated with 
it. Panel B reports estimates of Equation (5) that analyzes the associations between LTG 
                                                 
5 We use a sample pooled across firms and months for this regression test (Equation 4). As a sensitivity 
test, we also estimate Equation (4) for each GICS 1st level industry, and then recalculate E(ROE) and DFE, 
NDFE, PDFE, SNDFE, and SPDFE for each firm. We then rerun the regression tests of the study and the 
results are qualitatively consistent with those of our tabulated regressions. 
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and the mean reversion variables of ROE. Model 1 shows that LTG is negatively 
associated with the deviation of ROE from its mean, suggesting that analysts expect firms 
with higher levels of DFE to have lower earnings growth rates over the next three to five 
years. In Model 2, the coefficient on DFE is positive, while that on NDFE is negative, 
suggesting that, while analysts appear to consider high past ROE to be associated with 
high medium-term earnings growth, they predict earnings of firms with below-mean past 
ROE will grow at a faster pace in the following years. As predicted, the coefficient on 
SNDFE is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that analysts expect earnings 
growth of firms with extreme below-mean profitability to revert at a faster pace. SPDFE 
has the predicted negative sign, suggesting that analysts expect earnings growth of firms 
with extreme above-mean profitability to slow more rapidly over the next three to five 
years as their high profitability fades. It appears that the negative relationship between 
LTG and DFE in Model 1 is mainly attributable to the anticipated reversals of negative 
deviations and extremely negative and positive deviations of ROE from its mean. The 
results presented in Model 3 show that LTG is negatively associated with the level of 
previous year ROE. This suggests that analysts expect firms with higher past profitability 
to have lower earnings growth in the next three to five years, and vice versa.  
These findings suggest that analysts understand the mean reversion property of 
earnings, and they appear to exploit it when issuing LTG forecasts. As a sensitivity check, 
we run the regression tests in panel B of Table 3 for the sub-periods 1995-2000, 2001-
2006, and 2007-2012. The results (untabulated) are consistent with those reported in 
panel B of Table 3. The only exception is that SPDFE has the predicted sign but is not 
statistically significant in Model 2 for the 2007-2012 period.   
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4.2.Relationships between stock recommendation and the short-term growth forecast, 
LTG, RLTG and RISK 
 
The results of regression tests of our main predictions are presented in Table 4. The 
coefficient estimates of Equation (6a) are reported in panel A. Models 1-10 in the panel 
report OLS regression tests in which monthly consensus stock recommendation serves as 
the dependent variable. As predicted, in all the models, the coefficient on the short-term 
earnings growth forecast SG is positive and significant at the 1% confidence level. The 
results for Model 2 confirm the positive relationship between stock recommendation and 
LTG documented in Bradshaw (2004) and Jegadeesh et al. (2004). When LTG2 is added 
to the regression in Models 3-4 and 7-10, the relationship between stock recommendation 
and LTG increases markedly and, as predicted, the LTG2 coefficient is always negative 
and significant, indicating that the relationship between stock recommendation and LTG 
is positive but diminishing.  
Models 5-7 analyze the relationships between stock recommendations and the mean-
reversion variables (NDFE, PDFE, SNDFE and SPDFE) that are intended to serve as 
proxies to capture analysts’ expectations about earnings growth beyond the three-to-five 
year LTG forecast horizons, and hence also serve as a proxy for the latent variable RLTG. 
The coefficients on the mean-reversion variables are largely consistent with predictions, 
suggesting that analysts do take account of this longer-run aspect of profitability. The 
relationship of recommendations to the mean-reversion variables is little affected by the 
addition of various controls that reflect relevant aspects of uncertainty (forecast error, 
book-to-market, firm size) and the relationships between the risk variables and 
recommendations are largely consistent with predictions except for Size. In particular, 
Volatility is significant and negative in Models 8-10, suggesting that firms with volatile 
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stock prices tend to receive less favourable stock recommendations. The coefficient on 
Beta is positive in all models. However, the coefficient on LTG × Beta is significant and 
negative in Models 9 and 10. A possible explanation for this result is that analysts tend to 
be cautious about firms whose future earnings have a high degree of covariance with the 
overall economy (Fama and French, 1995) and consequently award them with less 
favourable recommendations. From this we infer that Beta enters analysts’ stock rating 
decision-making primarily through its adverse mediating effect on the LTG sensitivity of 
stock recommendation. 
Stock recommendations are measured on an ordinal scale. This raises the question of 
whether the LTG2 variable is capturing a truncation effect caused by the upper bound on 
the ratings scale. To assess the sensitivity of our results to this feature, we use an Ordered 
Multinomial Logit regression (Model 11) to test the non-linear relationship between LTG 
and stock recommendations, measured as the quintile ranking of consensus stock 
recommendations (a 5-point scale discrete variable). Consistent with the OLS 
regressions, the results for Model 11 show that the likelihood of obtaining more 
favourable recommendations still decreases with LTG2. This finding suggests that the 
OLS results cannot simply be attributed to the way recommendations have been scaled. 
We run all regression tests in panel A of Table 4 for the sub-periods 1995-2000, 2001-
2006, and 2007-2012. Untabulated results reveal that these results hold for all three sub-
periods exception that SNDFE has the wrong sign for the period 1995-2000. 
 Panel B of Table 4 reports results from estimating Equation (6b), a model that allows 
LTG to vary depending on whether the observation falls in the lowest quartile or not. 
Models 1-5 report the regressions based on the full 1995-2012 sample period. Contrary to 
prediction, the coefficient on LTG × LTG_Q1, is negative in both Model 1 and Model 2, 
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the latter model including the mean reversion variables, risks, and control variables. 
However, when allowance is made in Models 3-5 for whether the observation is in the 
pre- or post-financial crisis period by the inclusion of the interaction variable LTG × 
LTG_Q1× POSTY06, it is apparent that the explanation can be found in the changed 
economic conditions. This can be seen most clearly by comparing the results for Models 
2 and 5 that include all explanatory variables in Equation (6b). The coefficient on LTG × 
LTG_Q1 in Model 5 is positive as predicted, suggesting that firm-months in the bottom 
quartile of LTG forecasts receive more favourable stock recommendations prior to the 
financial crisis. However, the coefficient on LTG × LTG_Q1× POSTY06 is negative, 
indicating that the predicted relationship broke down after the crisis. This finding is 
consistent with the interpretation that, prior to the financial crisis, analysts expect future 
earnings of firms in the bottom quartile of LTG forecasts to grow at an increased rate over 
longer horizons due to the reversals in profitability, and they issue more favourable 
recommendations accordingly, but their beliefs that mean reversion would apply were 
punctured by the crisis. These results are confirmed in the separate regressions based on 
the sub-periods 1995-2006 and 2007-2012 (Models 6-9). The reasons are unclear, but 
may be due to how much analyst recommendations changed after the crisis. The 
relationships between recommendations and SG, the non-linear mean reversion variables, 
and the risk measures are qualitatively the same as those reported in panel A.     
Our theoretical framework suggests that LTG is an important determinant of stock 
recommendations. It may also be a function of stock recommendations. If LTG and 
recommendations are jointly determined, OLS parameter estimates could be biased and 
inconsistent. To investigate the potential endogeneity between recommendations and 
LTG, and its potential influence on the coefficient estimates of our regression analyses, 
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we use simultaneous equations methods to explore our main predictions. The results of a 
Hausman (1983) specification error test confirm that LTG and stock recommendations 
are endogenous. We therefore use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis to 
rerun the main regression tests in Table 4. The untabulated results of the simultaneous-
equation specification are consistent with those reported in previous sections. Hence, we 
conclude that the findings and inferences reported in previous sections hold after the 
endogeneity bias between REC and LTG is taken into account. 
 
4.3.Relationship between profitability of stock recommendations and analysts’ 
consideration of really long-term growth and risk 
 
In this section, we empirically explore whether analysts’ incorporation of RLTG into their 
recommendation decisions positively affects the profitability of those recommendations. 
Risk analysis is undoubtedly an important part of securities appraisal. We also analyze 
how analysts’ risk analysis can impact the profitability of their stock recommendations. 
Specifically, we seek to answer two questions: (1) Do analysts who consider the really 
long-term growth make more profitable stock recommendations than those who do not?  
(2) Do analysts who consider both really long-term growth and risk make more profitable 
stock recommendations? We use individual analyst recommendations and earnings 
forecasts along with LTG for this empirical analysis. 
We identify which analysts are capturing RLTG when making recommendations by 
estimating the following reduced form of Equation (6a) by analyst for every analyst for 
whom we have at least 60 observations:6  
                                                 
6 We estimate a reduced form of Equation (6) here because many of the analyst subsamples that contain 
the recommendation variable and proxies for RLTG are rather small (mean=21.61; Q3=26). The statistical 
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εβα ++= DFERECindividual 1                           (7) 
 
where RECindividual represents individual analyst stock recommendations, DFE, as 
discussed in section 2.2, represents the deviation of the firm’s prior-year ROE (ROEt-1) 
from its expected value. We then define a variable ANYST_RLTG, which is set equal to 1 
if β1 is negative, and 0 if it is positive, on the assumption that analysts with negative β1 
are paying attention to the mean reversion property of profitability and as such are more 
likely to take into account RLTG than are those with positive β1 estimates.7 We then 
identify analysts who consider both RLTG and risk in making profitable 
recommendations by estimating the following regression: 
εββα +++= VolatilityDFERECindividual 21                (8) 
 
where RECindividual and DFE are defined as earlier, and Volatility represents the twelve-
month historical stock price volatility. We classify analysts who take into account both 
RLTG and Volatility when β1 and β2 estimates in their respective regressions are both 
negative, regardless of statistical significance; all remaining analysts are classified as 
those who do not take both RLTG and risk into consideration. We use an indicator 
variable ANYST_RLTGVOL that is equal to 1 if β1 and β2 are both negative, and 0 
otherwise, to capture the two groups.   
We examine the returns of stock recommendations issued by the 1,262 analysts for 
whom we have the necessary data. We calculate accumulative abnormal returns from 
event date t (the announcement day of the recommendation) to t+s. We examine three 
                                                 
power of regressions including all explanatory variables in Equation (6a) would not be sufficient to make 
reliable inferences in many analyst regressions. 
7 We choose to not base the classifications on both the sign and statistical significance of β1 because of 
the concern that we are likely to face major power problems associated with small sizes of analyst 
subsamples. 
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return periods: a short 3-day event window (t-1 to t+1), a one-month window (t+30), and 
a twelve-month window (t+365). Following previous studies (e.g., Womack, 1996; 
Bradshaw, 2004), we calculate the size-adjusted abnormal return for a given firm’s 
recommendation by subtracting the appropriate CRSP market capitalization decile returns 
from the firm’s raw return given on the appropriate CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
index data file. We also calculate standard deviation-adjusted abnormal returns by 
subtracting the appropriate CRSP standard deviation decile portfolio returns from the raw 
return of the sample firm given on the CRSP NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ index file. We 
follow Ertimur et al. (2007) by notionally investing $1 in the stock for “buy” and “strong 
buy” recommendations, and going short $1 for “hold,” “sell,” and “strong sell” 
recommendations.   
We use a multivariate regression analysis to examine the relationship between 
abnormal returns of recommendations and indicator variables ANYST_RLTG and 
ANYST_RLTGVOL, which measure analyst incorporation of RLTG and risk. We include 
the following characteristic variables at the brokerage firm, analyst, and firm level in our 
regressions to control for factors that could affect recommendation profitability. We 
include the natural logarithm of the number of analysts employed by a brokerage firm 
(LogBSIZE) to control for brokerage firm size because analysts at large brokerage firms 
have access to more resources, can benefit from their firms’ stronger marketing abilities 
and they appear to issue more profitable stock recommendations (Clement, 1999; Stickel, 
1995; Ertimur et al., 2007). As proxies for analyst time constraints, the number of firms 
and industries covered by an analyst are expected to negatively impact forecast accuracy 
and recommendation profitability (Clement, 1999; Ertimur et al., 2007). We therefore 
include the number of firms an analyst covers in a given year (N_FIRM), as well as the 
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number of industries covered by the analyst in a given year (N_IND). We include the 
number of EPS1 forecasts issued by an analyst for a firm in a given year (FREQEPS) to 
proxy for analyst effort (Clement, 1999; Jung et al., 2012). We use the number of years 
an analyst has issued recommendations for a firm (FIRM_EXP), which is a firm-specific 
measure of experience, to control for analyst experience (Clement, 1999). Ertimur et al. 
(2007) show that earnings forecast accuracy is positively associated with 
recommendation profitability. We measure analyst forecast accuracy (ACCUR) as the 
absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings of a given fiscal year and the 
analyst’s last EPS1 forecast for that year, deflated by the absolute value of actual 
earnings. Firms with a high level of analyst following have better information 
environments and therefore stock reactions to recommendations of these firms are 
expected to be relatively weaker (e.g., Stickel, 1995). We use the number of analysts 
following a firm in a given year (N_ANYST) to capture this effect. We include the natural 
logarithm of the market value of the last fiscal year (LogMV) because market reactions to 
stock recommendations of small firms with poorer information environments tend to be 
stronger (e.g., Stickel, 1995). We include in the regression model the book-to-market 
ratio of the last fiscal year (BM) and an indicator variable of loss-making (LOSS) that is 
equal to 1 if the earnings before extraordinary items of the firm in a given year is 
negative, and 0 otherwise.  
We estimate Equation (9a) to examine whether analysts who consider RLTG make 




















where CAR(t,t+s) represents the cumulative (size- or standard deviation-adjusted) abnormal 
return to the stock from recommendation announcement day t to t+s. The ANYST_RLTG 
indicator variable measures analyst incorporation of RLTG. We consider a positive and 
statistically significant estimate of β1 as evidence that analysts who take into account 
RLTG make more profitable stock recommendations. We also control for year and 
industry effects. We cluster standard errors by analyst to correct for serial correlation. 
We estimate Equation (9b) to examine whether analysts who capture both RLTG and 



















The ANYST_RLTGVOL indicator variable measures analyst incorporation of both RLTG 
and risk. We consider a positive and significant estimate of β1 as evidence that analysts 
who take account of both RLTG and risk make more profitable stock recommendations.  
We collect individual analyst stock recommendations, as well as EPS1, and LTG 
forecasts from I/B/E/S for the 1995-2012 sample period. Accounting data come from 
COMPUSTAT, and stock return data come from CRSP. Among the 1,262 analysts in our 
sample, we find that 782 consider or are likely to consider RLTG when making 
recommendations (ANYST_RLTG=1), and the remaining 480 do not or are not likely to 
incorporate RLTG or earnings changes over time (ANYST_RLTG =0). The two groups 
issued a total of 240,366 stock recommendations during the sample period. 
We perform univariate tests of mean and median differences of abnormal returns and 
the control variables between the two analyst groups and the untabulated findings are as 
follows. The recommendations issued by the ANYST_RLTG=1 group analysts tend to be 
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more favourable. The means of the size-adjusted abnormal returns on the 
recommendations issued by analysts who tend to consider RLTG are statistically 
significantly higher than those of the recommendations issued by analysts who do not 
take account of RLTG. Furthermore, for all three return periods, the means and the 
medians of the standard deviation-adjusted returns of the ANYST_RLTG=1 group are both 
statistically higher than those of the ANYST_RLTG=0 group. Analysts who tend to take 
account of RLTG are generally employed by larger brokerage firms, and they appear to 
follow fewer industries and have more firm-specific experience than those who do not 
capture RLTG. They also appear to issue earnings forecasts more frequently and with 
lower forecast errors than those who do not incorporate RLTG. Finally, analysts who tend 
to take RLTG into account generally cover smaller firms with relatively lower analyst 
followings.   
The results for Equation (9a) are reported in panel A of Table 5. The R2s of the 
regressions are low, indicating (unsurprisingly) that stock returns are affected by many 
sources of news in addition to analysts’ forecasts. The resultant coefficient estimates are 
unbiased but therefore lack precision. With that caveat in mind, the results reveal that the 
ANYST_RLTG coefficient is statistically significant at least at the 10% confidence level 
for all return periods, suggesting that analysts who consider earnings growth beyond the 
next three to five years are able to provide more profitable stock recommendations to 
investors. The direction of the effect of the control variables are broadly as expected. The 
results for Equation (9b) are reported in panel B of Table 5. Overall, the results for 
ANYST_RLTGVOL are weaker than for ANYST_RLTG, but they tend to suggest that 
analysts who take account of both RLTG and risk generate higher abnormal returns. The 
results of control variables are similar to those in panel A of Table 5.  
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Our analysis uses DFE to proxy for RLTG. As a test of the reliability of this measure, 
we calculate the realized actual earnings growth rate over the next year, five years, and 
six to ten years8in order to shed light on the extent to which DFE predicts actual earnings 
growth rates in the future. Untabulated results reveal that DFE is negatively associated 
with the realized actual earnings growth rates in the subsequent ten years. We interpret 
this as suggesting that above (below) mean profitability is associated with declines (rises) 
in the realized actual earnings growth rates, which suggests that DFE is indeed a 
reasonable proxy for very long run profitability. In addition, we perform regressions to 
examine the relationship between firms’ raw returns and DFE. The untabulated results 
show that DFE is negatively associated with both one- and twelve-month returns, thereby 
suggesting that the stock market prices the change in the earnings growth rate over time 
correctly and in a way that is consistent with how it is related to analyst 
recommendations. 
 
5. Summary and concluding remarks 
Our study aims to enhance the understanding of analysts’ stock recommendation 
decisions. We present a valuation framework that provides a way of thinking about the 
linkages between analyst recommendations and their expectations about earnings growth 
over the short-term, medium-term, and the really long-term future. We present results 
suggesting that while positive, the effect of LTG on stock recommendations declines the 
greater is LTG, which we attribute to the attenuating effect of earnings growth beyond the 
LTG forecast horizons (RLTG) on the analysts’ value estimates for the stock, and hence 
                                                 
8 We calculate the actual five-year average earnings growth rate by fitting a least squares growth line to 
the logarithms of six earnings before extraordinary items, a method used by I/B/E/S. 
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on their stock recommendations. For the first time in the literature, we employ 
profitability mean reversion variables from prior empirical literature to proxy for analysts’ 
unobservable expectations about earnings growth beyond the LTG forecast horizons. We 
show how RLTG is associated with analysts’ stock recommendations and that the effort 
analysts exert to study earnings growth beyond the LTG forecast horizons and risk 
enhances recommendation profitability.  
To summarize, our study provides insights into analysts’ stock recommendation 
decisions. Our findings suggest that it is important for empirical studies to explicitly 
recognize the really long-term growth factor when examining the relationship between 
stock returns and firms’ future earnings and growth. Our proxy for the really long-term 
growth predicts the realized actual earnings growth rates over the next ten years, and thus 
could potentially act as a proxy for this latent variable. Furthermore, our study provides 
additional evidence that analysts’ fundamental analyses, such as investigations into firms’ 
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Step1: Collect consensus monthly forecasts from I/B/E/S Obs. Firms Obs. Firms
Stock recommendations 1,073,545 17,987
EPS1 1,028,291 17,733
Long-term growth forecasts (LTG) 754,144 13,325
Merge recommendations, LTG, and EPS1; eliminate duplicate 
monthly data points 744,274 13,181
Step2: Collect accounting data from Compustat
Estimate book-to-market, LogMV, the dividiend indicator 
variable, payout ratio, leverage, and R&D ratio
Merge Compustat and I/B/E/S data
No. of firm-month observations with explanatory variables for 
estimating equation (4) 429,698 7,437
Step 3: Calculate ROE, SG, earnings forecast error, and other 
variables
Collect the last reported EPS (EPS0) from I/B/E/S for firm-year 
units with I/B/E/S data 68,677 12,240
Calculate ROE for observations with positive book value 530,952 8,480
Remaining observations for estimating equations (4) and (5) 401,451 7,023
Calculate SG for firm-month units with positive EPS0 594,079 10,624
Step 4: Estimate risk variables using CRSP data
Calculate the five-year market beta for firm-month units 444,192 6,973
Calculate the annualized 3-month stock price volatility 607,576 9,790
Calculate idiosyncratic risk and the systematic risk component 
using one year daily return data 608,952 9,792
Merge CRSP, Compustat, and I/B/E/S data
Eliminate the 1% of the lowest and highest tails of all variables 
except for REC .
Remaining observations with all data items for estimating 
equation (6a) 284,655 4,946
Remaining
Sample period: January 1995-December 2012
This table describes our sample selection. The first two numeric columns report the number of firm-month 
(firm-year, in the case of accounting data) observations and firms. The next two columns report the number 
of firm-month observations and firms remained after each of the data merging and elimination procedures. 
At the first step, monthly consensus stock recommendations, long-term growth forecasts, and EPS1 are 
collected from I/B/E/S. The three data items are merged based on the estimation dates of I/B/E/S consensus 
forecasts (the third Thursday). At the second step, accounting data are collected from COMPUSTAT to 
estimate the variables in equation (4). Accounting data are merged with I/B/E/S forecasts. At step 3, ROE 
and SG are estimated using the last reported earnings per share (EPS0) collected from the detailed actuals 
file of the I/B/E/S. At step 4, for each observation with I/B/E/S analyst data, the five-year market beta and 
the annualized three-month stock price volatility are estimated using the CRSP return data. The one-year 
stock price volatility, its systematic risk component, and idiosyncratic risk are estimated using daily return 
data twelve months preceding the estimation dates of consensus recommendations. CRSP data are merged 
with I/B/E/S and COMPUSTAT data. To mitigate the potential influence of outliers, we trim the 1% of the 
lowest and highest tails of all variables except for stock recommendations.  
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Table 2  




Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max N
REC 3.782 0.617 1.000 3.350 3.800 4.200 5.000 744,323
LTG 0.170 0.098 0.010 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.600 730,230
SG 0.192 0.703 −2.713 −0.021 0.129 0.295 6.136 582,168
ROE 0.086 0.155 −1.222 0.045 0.093 0.147 0.681 520,543
DFE −0.002 0.070 −0.134 −0.049 −0.010 0.032 0.300 405,172
NDFE −0.027 0.034 −0.134 −0.049 −0.010 0.000 0.000 409,313
PDFE 0.025 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.300 409,299
Beta 1.085 0.677 −0.127 0.592 0.973 1.454 3.537 435,305
Volatility 0.476 0.263 0.128 0.286 0.409 0.594 1.620 595,425
LogMV 6.741 1.720 3.074 5.475 6.605 7.865 11.379 551,248
BM 0.535 0.355 0.044 0.283 0.460 0.693 2.374 538,406
R&D 0.042 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.794 567,196
LEVERAGE 0.538 0.245 0.066 0.344 0.540 0.717 1.189 563,717
DD 0.462 0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 573,631
PAYOUT 0.240 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.339 4.013 463,221










Table 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation (significance levels are in parentheses)  
 
REC LTG SG ROE DFE Beta Volatility LogMV BM R&D LEVERAGE DD PAYOUT
REC - 0.296 0.155 0.030 −0.038 0.069 0.051 −0.091 −0.174 0.032 −0.120 −0.167 −0.178
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG - 0.158 −0.221 −0.111 0.303 0.416 −0.221 −0.269 0.369 −0.384 −0.449 −0.306
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SG - −0.193 −0.243 0.039 −0.022 −0.027 −0.066 0.038 −0.025 −0.066 0.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ROE - 0.878 −0.151 −0.253 0.265 −0.205 −0.253 0.110 0.207 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
DFE - 0.037 0.060 −0.012 0.036 0.017 −0.028 −0.010 −0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Beta - 0.332 −0.036 −0.009 0.311 −0.228 −0.347 −0.233
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Volatility - −0.323 0.029 0.272 −0.218 −0.38 −0.201
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LogMV - −0.277 −0.081 0.159 0.373 0.170
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BM - −0.171 0.134 0.041 0.057
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R&D - −0.36 −0.304 −0.163
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)







Panel A of the table describes the main variables used in empirical analysis. Panel B of the table presents 




 REC = monthly analysts’ consensus (mean) stock recommendation from the I/B/E/S database; 
 LTG = monthly analysts’ consensus (median) long-term growth forecast from I/B/E/S; 
 SG = analyst forecast of short-term earnings growth rate, measured as the difference between 
analyst consensus one-year-ahead earnings per share forecast and the last reported 
earnings per share (both from I/B/E/S) divided by the last reported earnings per share, 
i.e., (EPS1-EPS0)/EPS0, when EPS0>0; 
 ROE = return on equity as of the prior fiscal year, measured as the last reported earnings per 
share before extraordinary items divided by book value per share;   
 DFE = deviation of return on equity from its mean, measured as the difference between return 
on equity as of the prior fiscal year (ROE) and its expected value, E(ROE), the fitted 
value from a cross-sectional regression;  
 NDFE = negative deviations of ROE from its mean, equal to DFE when DFE is negative and 0 
otherwise; 
 PDFE = positive deviations of ROE from its mean, equal to DFE when DFE is positive and 0 
otherwise;   
 Beta = five-year market beta, estimated using CRSP monthly firm and market returns over a 5-
year period based on the CAPM, i.e. εβα ++= MKTretreti ; 
 Volatility = three-month stock price volatility, estimated as annualized three-month standard 
deviation of daily stock returns from CRSP; 
 BM = book-to-market ratio as of the prior fiscal year, measured as book value divided by 
market value; 
 LogMV = natural logarithm of market value, which is estimated as the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by stock price at the end of the fiscal year; 
 DD = indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm issues common dividends in year t, and 
0 otherwise; 
 PAYOUT = dividend payout ratio, measured as total common dividends divided by earnings before 
extraordinary items if earnings before extraordinary items >0 or measured as total 
common dividends divided by (0.08*common equity) if earnings before extraordinary 
items<0;   
 R&D = research and development expense divided by net sales; 
 LEVERAGE = total liabilities divided by total assets; and 
Forecast Error = signed analyst EPS1 forecast error, measured as the difference between EPS1 and the 
















Table 3  




Panel A: Regression to explain the level of ROE 
  
ε+++++++= LEVERAGEdRDdLogMVdPAYOUTdDDdBMddROE 6543210  (4) 
















Adj R 2 0.172  
 
Panel B: Relationship between LTG and profitability mean reversion variables  
 
εα +++++= SPDFEbSNDFEbNDFEbDFEbLTG 4321                  (5) 
Model Predicted sign 1 2 3
Intercept ? 0.155 0.144 0.176
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)










n 401,451 401,451 512,837
Adj R 2 0.012 0.030 0.049
 
Panel A of the table reports the coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses) of the regression 
explaining the level of return on equity. Panel B of the table reports the results of regression tests that 
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analyze the associations between LTG and measures of the mean reversion of profitability. The dependent 
variable, LTG, represents monthly (median) long-term growth forecasts. We adjust the standard errors of 
the regression slopes in the regression tests for the possible dependence in residuals by clustering standard 
errors on firm and month dimensions. SNDFE, the square of DFE when DFE is negative and 0 otherwise; 







Table 4    
Relationships between stock recommendations and analysts’ earnings growth forecasts and risk measures 
   




















     (6a) 
Dependent variable
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Pred. sign Estimate Odds Ratio
Intercept + 3.756 3.469 3.207 3.177 3.732 3.721 3.141 3.113 3.373 3.320
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SG + 0.131 0.091 0.153 0.117 0.105 0.101 0.103 0.379 1.461
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG + 1.848 4.766 5.158 5.571 5.730 5.413 5.638 2.003 7.411
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG2 − −6.073 −6.934 −7.816 −8.241 −7.147 −7.139 −0.521 0.594
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NDFE + −0.109 0.439 0.634 0.471 0.560 0.252 1.238 3.449
(0.248) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.001)
PDFE + 1.061 1.293 1.055 0.977 1.008 0.656 3.999 54.544
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SNDFE + 15.584 14.564 7.941 7.186 8.257 1.970 31.918 7.E+13
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.035) (0.001)
SPDFE − −4.129 −4.929 −4.034 −4.217 −4.661 −3.376 −18.555 0.000









Panel A: (continued) 
Dependent variable
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Pred. sign Estimate Odds Ratio
Forecast Error − −0.049 −0.049 −0.050 −0.169 0.845
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Beta ? 0.006 0.114 0.132 0.335 1.398
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG × Beta − −0.681 −0.645 −1.945 0.143
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Volatility − −0.017 −0.171 −0.251 −1.142 0.319
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG × Volatility ? 0.972 0.388 7.665 2.E+03
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LogMV + −0.025 −0.026 −0.027 −0.087 0.917
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BM − −0.098 −0.104 −0.128 −0.385 0.680
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry effects No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Year effects No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
n 582,168 730,230 730,230 575,727 405,160 396,934 370,801 284,655 284,655 284,655 282,063












































Dependent variable: Consensus stock recommendation
Model Pred. sign 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Intercept + 3.319 3.497 3.319 3.289 3.587 3.166 3.426 3.335 3.459
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SG + 0.091 0.106 0.092 0.118 0.107 0.104 0.101 0.109 0.117
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG + 3.217 3.420 3.216 3.447 3.134 4.246 4.254 2.850 2.941
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG_Q1 − −0.023 −0.042 −0.136 −0.110 −0.230 −0.083 −0.068 0.081 0.092
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG_Q1 × POSTY06 ? 0.261 0.254 0.306
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG × LTG_Q1 + −0.496 −0.291 0.668 0.360 1.169 0.976 0.819 −1.838 −1.726
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG × LTG_Q1× POSTY06 ? −2.706 −2.669 −2.081
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG_Q4 + 0.614 0.595 0.614 0.699 0.565 0.663 0.580 0.521 0.452
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG × LTG_Q4 − −2.848 −2.811 −2.848 −3.258 −2.618 −3.565 −3.159 −2.810 −2.434
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)






Panel B: (continued) 
Model Pred. sign 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
NDFE + 0.241 0.588 0.439 −0.316 2.037
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001)
PDFE + 0.703 1.018 0.752 1.289 0.472
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SNDFE + 1.959 7.718 3.050 2.225 10.284
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SPDFE − −3.525 −3.960 −3.567 −5.775 −2.926
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Forecast Error − −0.003 −0.045 −0.053 −0.054 −0.041
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Beta ? 0.110 0.113 0.049 0.139
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG × Beta − −0.555 −0.543 −0.431 −0.627
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Volatility − −0.292 −0.278 −0.007 −0.230
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTG × Volatility ? 0.552 0.680 0.226 1.178
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LogMV + −0.026 −0.025 −0.030 −0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BM ? −0.136 −0.104 −0.139 −0.048
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry effects No Yes No No Yes No No
Year effects No Yes No No Yes No No
n 575,727 291,834 575,727 370,909 284,655 188,677 186,482 96,687 95,581
Adj R 2 0.137 0.194 0.138 0.156 0.197 0.168 0.179 0.097 0.116
Full Sample Period: 1995-2012 Period: 1995-2006 Period: 2007-2012
 
Panel A of the table presents the coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses) of equation (6a). The sample period is January 1995-December 2012. Models 
1-10 of the panel report the results of the OLS regression tests that employ monthly consensus stock recommendation as the dependent variable. REC can be any 
value between 1 and 5, with the favourableness increasing from “strong sell” to “strong buy”. Model 11 reports the estimates of the Ordered Multinomial regression 
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analysis that employs the quintile ranking of consensus stock recommendation as the dependent variable. Panel B of the table presents the coefficient estimates 
and p-values (in parentheses) of equation (6b). Following Petersen (2009), we adjust the standard errors of the regression slopes in the regression tests of the table 
for the possible dependence in residuals by clustering standard errors on firm and month dimensions. LTG2, square value of LTG; SNDFE, the square of DFE when 
DFE is negative and 0 otherwise; SPDFE, the square of DFE when DFE is positive and 0 otherwise; LTG_Q1, indicator variable taking the value of 1 when the 
LTG forecast falls into the 1st (low) quartile of LTG, and 0 otherwise; LTG_Q4, indicator variable taking the value of 1 when the LTG forecast falls into the 4th 
(high) quartile of LTG, and 0 otherwise; LTG × LTG_Q1, interaction variable between LTG and the indicator variable LTG_Q1; LTG × LTG_Q4, interaction 
variable between LTG and the indicator variable LTG_Q4; Industry effects, vector of industry indicator variables based on the GICS level-1 classification; Year 
effects, vector of calendar year indicator variables. POSTY06, indicator variable taking the value of 1 when the consensus recommendation is estimated after 
December 2006, and 0 otherwise. LTG × LTG_Q1× POSTY06, interaction variable between LTG × LTG_Q1 and POSTY06. See also Table 2 for variable definitions.     
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Table 5  
Relationship between stock recommendation profitability and analyst incorporation of the 
really long-term growth and risk 
 
 



















    (9a) 
 
Dependent variable
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
3-day 1-month 12-month 3-day 1-month 12-month
Intercept 0.033 0.049 0.129 0.040 0.054 0.043
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.015)
ANYST_RLTG 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.006
(0.001) (0.004) (0.078) (0.001) (0.006) (0.100)
LogBSIZE 0.000 0.000 −0.005 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.161) (0.542) (0.001) (0.099) (0.386) (0.319)
N_FIRM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.014) (0.865) (0.820) (0.034) (0.833) (0.141)
N_IND −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.003
(<.001) (0.001) (0.072) (<.001) (<.001) (0.001)
FREQEPS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(<.001) (<.001) (0.079) (<.001) (<.001) (0.001)
ACCUR 0.003 0.004 −0.016 0.007 0.005 0.008
(<.001) (0.004) (0.029) (<.001) (0.001) (0.221)
FIRM_EXP 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.006) (<.001) (<.001)
N_ANYST 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.129) (0.578) (0.322) (0.006) (0.492) (0.026)
LOSS 0.001 0.003 −0.022 0.002 0.004 −0.003
(0.106) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.666)
BM 0.000 0.002 0.017 −0.001 0.003 0.039
(0.748) (0.124) (0.011) (0.279) (0.059) (<.001)
LOGMV −0.004 −0.006 −0.013 −0.005 −0.006 −0.011
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
n 141,473 146,984 147,540 149,569 151,116 149,350
Adj R 2 0.0230 0.011 0.005 0.020 0.010 0.005
Size-Adj. Abnormal Returns Std Deviation-Adj. Abnormal Returns
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Table 5 (continued)  


















   (9b) 
Dependent variable
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
3-day 1-month 12-month 3-day 1-month 12-month
Intercept 0.034 0.050 0.112 0.043 0.050 0.044
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.012)
ANYST_RLTGVOL 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.007
(0.071) (0.146) (0.545) (0.078) (0.103) (0.044)
LogBSIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.103) (0.423) (0.886) (0.091) (0.175) (0.280)
N_FIRM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.009) (0.900) (0.421) (0.032) (0.863) (0.122)
N_IND −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.003
(<.001) (0.001) (0.024) (<.001) (<.001) (0.001)
FREQEPS 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.001)
ACCUR 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.008
(<.001) (0.646) (0.093) (0.194) (0.412) (0.222)
FIRM_EXP 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.017) (<.001) (<.001)
N_ANYST 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.143) (0.577) (0.001) (0.006) (0.303) (0.026)
LOSS 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 −0.003
(0.101) (0.004) (0.204) (0.003) (<.001) (0.667)
BM 0.000 0.002 0.022 −0.001 0.002 0.039
(0.739) (0.114) (<.001) (0.560) (0.077) (<.001)
LOGMV −0.004 −0.006 −0.015 −0.005 −0.006 −0.011
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
n 141,473 148,193 144,856 150,850 149,775 149,350
Adj R 2 0.0230 0.011 0.007 0.019 0.011 0.006
Std Deviation-Adj. Abnormal ReturnsSize-Adj. Abnormal Returns
 
This table reports the regression results of the relationships between the profitability of recommendations 
and analyst incorporation of RLTG and risk. Panel A reports the results of estimating Equation (9a). Panel B 
reports the results of estimating Equation (9b). ANYST_RLTG, 1 if the estimate of DFE in Equation (8) for 
an analyst is negative, and 0 otherwise; ANYST_RLTGVOL, 1 if the estimates of DFE and Volatility in 
Equation (9) for an analyst are both negative, and 0 otherwise; RECindividual, stock recommendations issued 
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by individual analysts on the I/B/E/S database; AdjSizettCAR
−
+− 1,1 , size-adjusted cumulative abnormal stock 
return over the three trading days beginning on the day prior to the stock recommendation announcement 
day t. We calculate the size-adjusted returns by subtracting the appropriate CRSP market capitalization 
decile returns from the stock’s raw returns; AdjSizettCAR
−
+30, , size-adjusted cumulative abnormal stock return 
over the 30 days following the stock recommendation announcement day t; AdjSizettCAR
−
+365, , size-adjusted 




+− 1,1 , standard deviation decile-adjusted cumulative abnormal stock return over the three days 
beginning on the trading day prior to the stock recommendation announcement day t. We calculate the 
standard deviation decile-adjusted abnormal returns by subtracting the appropriate CRSP standard deviation 
decile returns from the stock’s raw returns; AdjStdttCAR
−
+30, , standard deviation decile-adjusted cumulative 




+365, , standard deviation decile-adjusted cumulative abnormal stock return over the 12 months 
following the stock recommendation announcement day t; N_FIRM, number of firms covered by an analyst 
in a given year; N_IND, number of industries covered by an analyst in a given year; LogBSIZE, nature log of 
the number of analysts employed by a brokerage firm in a given year; BM, book-to-market ratio; LogMV, 
nature log of the market capitalization of the last fiscal year; LOSS, 1 if the firm’s earnings before 
extraordinary items is negative in the previous year, and 0 otherwise; N_ANYST, number of analysts 
following a specific firm in a given year; FIRM_EXP, number of years the analyst issues stock 
recommendation for a specific firm; FREQEPS, number of one-year-ahead earnings per share forecasts issued 
by an analyst for a given firm in a given year; ACCUR, accuracy of the analyst’s earnings forecast, measured 
as the absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings and the analyst’s last earnings forecast, 
deflated by the absolute value of the actual earnings.   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
